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- Budapest Voyage
- hungarian studies - EPA - Országos Széchényi Könyvtár
- hungarian studies - EPA - Országos Széchényi Könyvtár
- Budapest Voyage
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By late the bipolar structure of the world had already taken shape. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had decided that not only was there no longer any ground for their cooperation, but to continue cooperating would menace their respective positions in the world, if not their very existence.
Hence the most pressing issues that faced the victorious powers remained unresolved. No collective peace treaty was signed with Japan, and Germany ended up as two separate states. The division of Germany had not been premeditated, but it was probably inevitable.
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A case in point was China, where Mao Tse-tung's victory meant the "loss" of that country for the United States. This loss was exploited by Stalin through the signing with China of a pact of friendship that guaranteed military, political and economic gains for the Soviet Union.
In exchange Moscow recognized Chinese sovereignty and the Chinese communist party's preeminence in leading revolutionary movements in the Asian region. Stalin, who thought that a friendly regime ruling the whole Korean peninsula was needed in order to hold off a seemingly inevitable Japanese revanchist invasion of the Soviet Union, agreed to support Kim on the assumption that the United States would not intervene.
Learning from the experiences of European diplomacy in the late s, when the democratic powers had mistaken each of Hitler's aggressive steps as Germany's final move rather than as what they actually were, the stepping-stones for further gains, the United States regarded the Korean aggression as a mere prelude to further communist expansion orchestrated by Moscow. Political relations between East and West were so hostile that virtually no contact remained between them.
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Relations had degenerated into mutually slanderous political campaigns; and the Soviet "lager" lined up unequivocally behind the Soviet Union in all questions of international relations. In fact, the communist regimes of the people's democracies by and large identified their own national interests with those of the Soviet Union; and they shelved mutual grievances to increase bloc solidarity.
A rift appeared within the Soviet bloc itself, as meilleure creme de nuit anti age 40 ans Broz Tito's otherwise Stalinist Yugoslavia was ostracized from the family of fraternal communist nations. Moscow's allies slavishly followed an anti-Yugoslav course to such a degree that minor clashes on the Hungarian-Yugoslav border, for example, became every-day occurrences.
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The Soviet bloc embarked on a campaign of military build-up inwhich, as a result of Stalin's insistence that the newly created people's democracies had to share the burden of preparing for the seemingly inevitable military conflict with the "imperialists," was drastically accelerated in January The continental division involved to a considerable extent economic issues.
On meilleure creme de nuit anti age 40 ans one hand the United States introduced an economic embargo starting in against the Soviet bloc and was joined reluctantly by its European allies.
On the other hand the Soviet Union, which had failed to secure East-West trade on its own terms, imposed a policy of autarchy on its allies and made preparations for close economic cooperation and even coordination among the members of the Soviet orbit. Nevertheless, the flow of ideas and people came to a virtual standstill. Western ideas only reached people behind the iron curtain illegally, through radio broadcasts; and except for some limited travel for business purposes East Europeans were not allowed to visit the non-communist world.
The Soviet export of Stalinism introduced a large degree of political and economic uniformity on nations with such divergent backgrounds as Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The Kremlin also tried to shape these societies to the Soviet Union's own image by attempting to destroy social autonomies, that is to eliminate much of what makes a society a society.
The role of ideological commitment cannot be overestimated, and it was exactly this commitment that made the real difference in the control the Soviets had before and after the communist seizure of power. One would expect that these advisors were imposed on the country, but the records suggest that the Hungarian leaders actually asked for them. Sometimes the Soviets did not send advisors on time, and the Hungarians had to keep asking for them.
For example, on one occasion Moscow dragged its feet about sending the three military advisors requested by a Hungarian delegation in negotiations with Bulganin and Shtemenko. Kenneth Waltz argued that to "say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its external and internal problems including whether or not to seek assistance from others legjobb anti aging bőrtanács in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them".
While Waltz recognized that constraints restrict a nation's freedom to act, he would not regard a nation as sovereign unless it surrendered its freedom of action voluntarily.
The Rákosi regime not only owed its existence to Moscow, but even its political structure was determined there, and it meilleure creme de nuit anti age 40 ans important appointments only after consulting with the Soviets.
Hence, for example, in the chief of staff of the Hungarian army was appointed "in agreement with the Soviet advisor comrades". Hungary adopted the Soviet political structure not only in the formal, bureaucratic sense but also in that the highest party decision-making organ, the Political Committee was not consulted in the most important policy issues. In Junewhen Rákosi was demoted in Moscow, the members of the Politburo felt free to air their frustration for not having been consulted, for their views anti aging szérum diy fire been disregarded, for their opinions not having been solicited, and for having been intimidated to keep silent.
According to Politburo member Károly Kiss, Rákosi, Gerő, Farkas and Révai decided on issues of national importance during the course of discussions among themselves. The most important matters were decided in such conversations and were not addressed either in the Politburo or the Central Committee. After the situation changed in the sense that many momentous political issues came to be decided by the Political Committee.
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These included: the dismissal of Imre Nagy and subsequently that of Mátyás Rákosi, the fate of Mihály Farkas, and issues such as the fate of the Hungarian-Soviet joint companies and the Soviet-Hungarian uranium agreement.
On some occasions, as during the critical debates on the fate of Rákosi in Julya Soviet representative was present and offered his views, but he did not decide the outcome. The judicial branch of government was subordinated to the executive branch to such an extent that, for example, in the Rajk trial the Hungarian Workers' Party HWP leadership decided not only that the defendants would be found guilty, but also what sentences - mostly death - they would receive.
Even before the trial Rákosi confided to Baranov that Rajk would be tried and then executed. Laws were passed in the form of government decrees, which in turn were formulated by the party leadership.
To make sure that the Parliament would cause no inconvenience, its members were almost exclusively drawn from the party.
Terminé en Sa chaîne d'origine a été détruite pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et remplacée par un pont moderne par câble qui a ouvert ses portes en La façade la plus étroite de Budapest est une maison de six mètres et vingt centimètres de largeur située du côté Buda du pont Elizabeth et peut être facilement repérée en traversant le Danube depuis Pest. Elégant et complexe, ouvert en ; il relie les bains de Gellért Gellért fürdő à Buda à la salle centrale du marché Nagy Vásárcsarnok à Pest.
The exact percentage of non-party members was decided prior to the elections. One obvious choice was the Soviet embassy in Budapest, and this line of communication was especially active in the summer months ofwhen Soviet Ambassador Iuri Andropov regularly consulted with Hungarian party leaders.
A more direct contact to the Kremlin was offered by the so-called VCh line, which connected the HWP's first secretary to the Stalin secretariat. This line of direct communication was opened inbut one had already existed in Sofia for Dimitrov, and there were two such lines in Warsaw: one for Mine and the other for the Polish central committee. Such lines of communication were also at the disposal of the Soviet ambassador and the military attaché.
These were addressed to comrade Filipov or a variant of this pseudonym.
The Hungarian party boss asked for Moscow's policy guidance in twenty-two such messages, but the Vozhd seldom bothered to answer. His silence was probably taken as acquiescence. Similarly to the ciphered telegrams, these contained proposals and requests to be heard and acted upon in the Kremlin.
Finally, Rákosi was received personally by Stalin in Moscow, or elsewhere in the Soviet Union, on eight or nine occasions. The lower level communication, for example between Hungarian ministries and their Soviet counterparts, was done through the well-paid Soviet advisors, who worked in Hungary. Rákosi was surrounded by a cult of adulation, but as he himself admitted, he was only a "disciple" of Stalin.
Nevertheless, by his own admission, Rákosi considered himself to be the best of these disciples. Indeed, the international hierarchy was scrupulously observed by the state controlled media, as well as in every other forum.
The ultimate light, wisdom and guidance came from the Soviet Union in general and from Stalin in particular. Prior to this had not been so. On one occasion the party leadership, including Gerő, Farkas and Rákosi, received strong criticism for disregarding the interests of the Soviet Union in economic, cultural and propaganda affairs, for distancing themselves from the Soviet Union in their fear of being branded as Moscow's agents, and for deviating from the correct line toward a "nationalist" tendency, the most serious error of all.
Rákosi's recently published memoirs support the view that like Molotov, he remained a Stalinist to his last breath.
He was seemingly not after wealth, or even after power for its own sake. He had devoted his life to the great cause and no amount of corpses, blood, sweat, or tears could stand in his way.
He regretted nothing he had done. He knew his own and his country's limits. This did not mean that the Hungarian communists and Rákosi did not each have their own separate agendas. On some occasions the Hungarians strove to assert Hungary's interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This was particularly true in the effort to reduce the size of the payments demanded by the Soviets under various pretexts.
On at least two occasions the Hungarian communist leaders sought to protect the interests of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia after the treaty of friendship had been signed with Czechoslovakia.
Rákosi objected to the Slovakian policy towards the Hungarian national minority, which "contradicted the Stalinist nationality policy, as well as the treatment of Hungarians in Romania and the Soviet Union".
He wrote a critique of an article that appeared in the journal Novoe Vremia, calling its suggestion to limit the political right of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia "harmful". He demanded that the journal publicly renounce this "incorrect attitude".
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The Hungarian party's chief ideologist József Révai asked his Soviet counterpart Suslov whether the Hungarians could raise the issue in the Informburo and asked for the help of the "fraternal parties" to resolve it. Suslov, however, recommended a bilateral approach. Rainer has argued, Rákosi on occasion produced his own initiatives. He tried to play an active role against Yugoslavia by recommending that an émigré Yugoslav press organ be edited in Moscow, or one of the people's democracies no doubt he was thinking of Hungarya "unified Yugoslav center" and an illegal communist party on Yugoslav territory be set up, and military partisan activity against his southern neighbor be organized.
In this show trial Rákosi attempted to stretch Moscow's leash the farthest, and his personal ambitions - as well as those of Mihály Farkas - became most apparent.
The Polish authorities could not come up with a case against him, and as a result Gomulka escaped Rajk's fate. The Hungarian party leader could not have known that his role in the show trial would meilleure creme de nuit anti age 40 ans against him and prove to be his demise. At the time, however, the Rajk affair seemed to provide a chance for Rákosi to refute the earlier accusations from the Soviets that his position in the struggle against the Hungarian Trotskyists had been incorrect and had impeded the struggle of the Soviet and Hungarian state security organs against them.
By "revealing" the Rajk case's international connotations, Rákosi "helped" to "unmask" the enemy that had wormed its way into the ranks of the fraternal parties. His main targets were the Czechoslovaks in general and Klement Gottwald in particular, whom he accused of not doing anything to unmask and reveal spies and enemies within his party.
There may even have been a personal motive involved for Rákosi because Gottwald had pursued an unrelenting campaign against the Hungarians in Slovakia.
Rákosi had protested against this campaign, and Gottwald had responded by refusing to talk to the Hungarian communist party. The ambitious Hungarian dictator penned a letter in which he named sixty-five alleged Anglo-American spies.
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Dissatisfied with the apparent lack of results, Rákosi sent his brother Zoltán Bíró to Prague. Rákosi's envoy expressed his dismay that the Czech Ministry of the Interior was sabotaging the exposure of the spy ring because Interior Minister Nosek had been implicated in the confessions of the spies arrested in Hungary.
Provoking his hosts even further, Bíró condemned the slowness of the tripartite commission and advocated the arrest of most of the suspects. Furthermore, he asked Gottwald whether "the Czechoslovak comrades were menaced by the treason of the Czechoslovak army's generals, and that of Svoboda in particular".
Bíró was then assured that, just as the Hungarian army, the Czechoslovak army was also under constant cleansing. Gottwald was visibly troubled and asked whether the Rajk trial could be conducted without mentioning any of the Czechoslovak names. Bíró responded that the Czechs were underestimating the international significance of the Rajk case. As Rákosi noted, "the Soviet organs and authorities give little assistance, what is more, they sometimes do not pay enough attention to the numerous spy groups that have been arrested by the Hungarians".
This process was in tune with the Stalinist dogma of the sharpening of the class struggle. According to the diabolic explanation, "as the enemy weakened, its resistance grew".
Another leading communist also observed, "on the higher stage of development the class struggle intensifies" and this was "inescapable".
It didn't make a difference whether they were right wing or left wing, they were "all the same, informers all of them". Stalin agreed to their arrest, but wanted a closed trial. Zöld knew what was waiting for him when he was dismissed by the party boss at a Politburo meeting on April 20, He went home, killed his family, and committed suicide. In fact, historian János M. Rainer has noticed, on some occasions the Kremlin might even have exercised some restraint on the head of the HWR Once Ráncok kialakulása prohibited the dismissals of Gábor Péter, the head of the secret police, and Mihály Farkas.
When Rákosi started to list their mistakes, the Vozhd waved him down, "leave them alone". Thus, Rákosi became convinced that the two would-be meilleure creme de nuit anti age 40 ans had gotten wind of what was in the making and had alerted their respective patrons, Bulganin and Beria, to save them.
Heavy purges were carried out in the army and the air force; and "a whole line of officers, who had systematically disabled aircraft, had to be arrested". These were followed by the proceedings against "left wing social democrats".
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This phase involved people. The trials of army generals came next. In the Sólyom case forty-four people were convicted, and ten of them were executed. The continuing struggle against "clerical reaction" was marked by the trial of Archbishop Grősz. On January 13, Pravda informed its readers that the Soviet security organs had unmasked a group of murderous Zionist doctors.
The "Zionist doctors" were allegedly in the service of an "international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization, Joint, which had been established by American intelligence services". Historians differ as to what the precise purpose of the doctors' plot might have been. The possibility exists that it was a prelude to an all-out campaign against Soviet Jewry. On the other hand, in his recent book Vojtech Mastny has argued that the doctors' conspiracy to shorten the lives of distinguished patients may have had some foundation, and that there is no evidence to support that it signaled an all-out anti-Semitic campaign.
The communist daily Szabad Nép carried the Pravda report on the Zionist plot. A few days after a bomb exploded at the Soviet embassy in Israel, on February 11,which had sparked off massive arrests of Jewish intellectuals in the Soviet Union, Mátyás Rákosi, who was himself Jewish but who had been quite willing to exploit popular anti-Semitic sentiments for his political ends, delivered a speech to the HWP Politburo on meilleure creme de nuit anti age 40 ans Zionist threat.
He accused the United States of "mobilizing Zionism and Israel" to increase the work of spies and saboteurs in the people's democracies. Rákosi alluded to the recent arrest of the secret police's Jewish leader Gábor Péter, whom he accused of having worked with Nazi and Zionist police informers, and promised to "investigate" whether Zionists had infiltrated the party.
Of this infiltration, Rákosi seemed to be convinced. He called for increased vigilance in view of the fact that the president of the Israelite religious community in Budapest had "turned out" to be a former "spy for the Gestapo".
The drive against the Zionists would not be anti-Semitism. The allusion to Zionism as a center for American spying was by no means a coincidence. Although the trial was never staged because Stalin suddenly died, the preparations for a large anti-Semitic campaign had begun in the Fall of The Hungarian authorities had prepared various scenarios, all of which followed the pattern set by the Slansky trial in In return the United States would support Israel.
That is, Zionist agents had wormed their way into the higher echelons of Hungarian political life, the economy, and the state security organs.